In ad-hoc networks, autonomous wireless nodes can communicate by forwarding messages for each other. For routing protocols in this setting, it is known that a malicious node can perform a variety of attacks just by not behaving according to the specification. Whilst secure versions of routing protocols are under development, little effort has been made to formalise the scenario similarly to developments in the realm of traditional security protocols for secrecy and authentication. We present a broadcast process calculus suitable to describe the behaviour of protocols which require a local memory component for every node. By adding annotations for the origin of messages, we are able to formalise a vital security property in this context, called store authorisation. Furthermore, we describe a static analysis for the detection of violations of this property. For a model of the AODV protocol in our calculus, we are then able to deduce that an attacker may introduce a routing loop in certain networks.
Introduction
Ad-hoc networks are a wireless communication paradigm which allows mobile nodes to exchange messages without the need for fixed infrastructure or a centralised control component. Instead, they cooperate with each other by forwarding data in a multi-hop fashion. Specifically designed routing protocols try to determine this behaviour in a resource-efficient way.
Only recently, with emerging critical applications in the health-care sector, military communication, and elsewhere, researchers have started to question the security of these routing protocols by describing attacks and informally discussing security requirements [5, 4] . Taking into account the need for securing routing information relevant for all nodes in the network, it is not surprising that these requirements turn out to be quite different from classical, "point-to-point" security properties such as secrecy and authentication, which have been formally investigated in the realm of cryptographic protocols for a long time. However, attempts to formalise the findings in the ad-hoc network setting have not been made as to our knowledge.
In earlier work [6] , we have shown a way to model routing behaviour of ad-hoc networks in a variant of the CBS process calculus [9] and developed a static analysis for message flow in networks. Here, we build on this work in order to formalise a security property for ad-hoc networks, mentioned in [4] , which we call store authorisation: storage of routing information concerning certain nodes should be authorised by these nodes themselves. In order to do this, we extend our calculus with a tuple store component, private to every node, and actions for storage and retrieval of tuples. Furthermore, we introduce annotations to track the origin of broadcast messages. We model the critical fragment of the Ad-hoc On-demand Distance Vector (AODV) routing protocol [8] and show that a specifically designed static analysis can record violations of the store authorisation property in the presence of an attacker. An interpretation of the analysis results reveals that under certain conditions a routing loop attack [5] can be performed, which causes packets to traverse the network in a cycle, thus draining power and bandwidth resources from the network. For this, our attacker model needs only to be able to eavesdrop on all communications of the network and to forge routing messages.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: In Section 2 we present the variant of CBS we are using to describe routing behaviour in ad-hoc networks. It comprises a store-like component for every node and annotations for the origin of messages. The operational semantics employs the annotations in order to prevent derivations in networks where nodes try to violate the store authorisation property.
In Section 3 we review the concept of store authorisation, develop a control flow analysis which computes a safe approximation for violations of this property, and present a simple attacker model.
In Section 4 we describe the operation and our model of the AODV protocol. We apply our analysis to find all the property violations the attacker can perform and discuss the implications of this finding to the protocol security.
The Calculus
In [6] we have presented a variant of the process calculus CBS [9] which enabled us to model the behaviour of a source routing protocols for ad-hoc networks. The key idea of the calculus is to express multi-hop message passing by letting nodes drop messages if they are not within the transmission range of the
,α σ node | N 1 N 2 parallel composition of networks Table 1 Syntax of the Calculus broadcasting node. The network topology, which determines this behaviour, is specified in a so-called allocation environment α.
Source routing protocols are characterised by the fact that routes are part of a sent message as lists of node names. Distance vector protocols, which we want to investigate here, require nodes to locally store the next hop to a certain destination node. In order to be able to express this behaviour, we extend our calculus with a store-like component. This might be compared to the idea of tuple spaces in coordination languages such as Klaim [2] , but with the important difference that the store is accessible only locally. This seems to be more suitable in the context of communicating nodes which have to perform some private computations and store operations in between the transmission of messages. For security analysis, it enables us to draw a clear distinction between information available to an eavesdropper of communications and to an attacker who has captured a node and tries to access the store directly.
Syntax
The calculus comprises three syntactic categories: terms E, processes P , and networks N , which are defined in Table 1 .
Terms are either variables x ∈ X , names n ∈ N , or locations ∈ L. We choose to add locations to the set of terms, whilst they are also used to distinguish nodes, as we would like to be able to explicitly state the origin of messages in message components. As usual, we abbreviate lists of terms with the tilde, e.g.Ẽ represents E 1 , . . . , E k for some k. We also write |Ẽ| for the length of the listẼ, andẼ =Ẽ denotes |Ẽ| = |Ẽ | = k for some k and E i = E i for i = 1, . . . , k.
Processes are in polyadic form and incorporate term matching for message components like in the calculus LySa [3] . Syntactically, this is expressed by the semicolon: Terms before the semicolon have to equal the first components of a message or tuple, which gives a powerful way to distinguish between messages and tuples of different format.
Furthermore, we add annotations for the origin of terms, written in square brackets. The intuition behind this is that the initiator of a certain chain of cause and effect remains visible. Intermediate nodes which just react to a message reception will copy the origin annotation and take it as annotation for any action caused.
We distinguish the following processes: 0 represents the terminated process. The sending (broadcast) of messages is denoted by Ẽ [E] ! P , whereẼ is the message and E is an annotation term evaluating to a location. The action (Ẽ;x)[x] ? P expresses receiving of messages:Ẽ has to match with the first message components, the remaining ones will be bound tox; the annotation term E will be bound to x.
Storage of tuplesẼ is represented by Ẽ [E] Ẽ ↓ P , where the initiator E has to be in the listẼ of authorised initiators, which evaluates to a list of locations. One can retrieve tuples from the store by (Ẽ;x) ↑ P 1 : P 2 , wherẽ E has to match with the first tuple components, the remaining ones will be bound tox. Depending on whether a matching tuple is found we continue with P 1 or P 2 .
The if-expression "if E = E then P 1 else P 2 " continues with P 1 or P 2 after determining term equality of E and E . Constants A may represent definitions of processes. Processes can also be executed in parallel, written as P 1 | P 2 .
Networks consist of the parallel composition N 1 N 2 of located processes P:
,α σ . The location is unique for a located process and enables to distinguish different nodes. The allocation environment α : L → [0, 1] provides us with the connectivity information of a node and thus the network topology: The likelihood that a message sent by node P :
,α σ is received by node P :
,α σ is expressed by α ( ). σ represents the local tuple store of the node. We may drop α or σ whenever they are not necessary in a certain context.
Operational Semantics
The operational semantics of the calculus is defined by means of two transition relations on networks. 
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: ! ? : Table 2 Operational Semantics 1 a network N 1 to a network N 2 with probability p during transmission of a message m. Like in original CBS, is drawn from a set {!, ?, :}, and the actions of sending, receiving and losing the message m are denoted by m!, m?, and m:. Messages are written Ẽ [E] ,α , whereẼ is a list of variable-free terms, E is the annotation term, and and α represent location and allocation environment of the immediate sender.
The second relation N 1 − → N 2 transforms a network with respect to local, non-interacting computations only. The two relations are not mutually dependent, however this style of specification makes sure that in a derivation all nodes have completed local computations before the next message exchange.
The rules for the first transition relation m − → p are given in Table 2 . Rule nil expresses that the nil process 0 :
,α σ silently discards any message with probability 1. Rules send 1 and send 2 describe the behaviour of Ẽ [E] ! P:
,α σ . Such a node silently discards incoming messages with probability 1 as shown in rule send 2 . It evolves to P:
,α σ with probability 1 when broadcasting a message, specified in rule send 1 . Furthermore, the message will carry the annotation E.
There are three rules for the syntactic term for receiving, (Ẽ;x)[x] ? P:
,α σ . rec 1 and rec 2 describe the semantics if the first message components match with the expectation, i.e.Ẽ =Ẽ 1 and |Ẽ 2 | = |x|, for a incoming message: In rule rec 1 , the node chooses to receive the message
,α with probability α ( ), in which case variables of the listx get bound to their respective components inẼ 2 ; also, the annotation term E is bound to x. On the other hand, the node may also discard the message with probability 1 − α ( ), which is described in rule rec 2 . Rule rec 3 expresses that a node discards a message with probability 1 if the message contents do not match with the expected message, i.e. the first message components do not match or the message does not have the right length.
Definitions A:
,α σ get simply expanded as shown in rule def. Rules par 1 and parrfor parallel composition of networks describe how a broadcast message is propagated to all processes. They use the algebra for the composition of 1 , 2 ∈ {!, ?, :} which is shown in Table 2 . Like in original CBS, these rules makes sure that every node in the network decides about receiving or discarding a certain message, and also that it is not attempted to broadcast two messages at the same time, because 1 • 2 =⊥. The probability for the transition is q 1 · q 2 when the components' transitions have probabilities q 1 and q 2 .
We display rules for the second transition relation − → in Table 3 . The rule store adds a tuple Ẽ to the its local store σ if the initiator E is found in the list of authorised initiatorsẼ , written E ∈Ẽ .
Two rules for retrieval (Ẽ;x) ↑ P 1 : P 2 :
,α σ distinguish between the cases where a certain tuple is or is not contained in the local store. In rule ret 1 , if the first components of a tuple match and the tuple has the right length, the remaining tuple componentsẼ 2 get bound tox in the first process P 1 . Note in particular that in the case of two or more matching tuples, there will be a nondeterministic choice for the selected tuple; in a concrete application, determinism might be achieved by the choice ofẼ 1 . Rule ret 2 states that if no matching tuple is found, process P 2 will continue.
The two rules for if-expressions if E = E then P 1 else P 2 :
,α σ choose P 1 or P 2 as continuing process, depending on the term equality E = E . Ifexpressions are included for clarity although they might be modelled with the retrieval statement. Finally, the semantics for parallel composition P 1 | P 2 is straightforward. The transition relation is meant to be reflexive, i.e. P − → P , such that changes in only one branch are possible.
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Security Analysis
The goal of the analysis is to safely approximate violations of the store authorisation property of the annotated calculus in the presence of an attacker who may eavesdrop on and forge any message. It is represented by a flow logic, an approach to control flow analysis which focuses on specifying rather than computing the analysis result. Our implementation is then given by a transformation of the flow logic's rules into terms of a fragment of first order logic, which can then be solved using the Succinct Solver [7] .
Store Authorisation
Rule store in Table 3 states that a derivation in the calculus gets stuck for a node Ẽ [E] Ẽ ↓ P :
Recall that E evaluates to a location which represents the initiator of the chain of cause and effect which led to the storage operation, e.g. another node which had sent an update on some routing information. Furthermore,Ẽ evaluates to a list of locationsL which specify the locations authorised to trigger the storage operation. The store authorisation property says, expressed in the terms of our calculus, that "an initiator of a storage operation Ẽ [ ] L ↓ P must be specified in the list L of authorised nodes for this operation".
The significance of this security property can be seen as follows: Communication protocols for multi-hop routing, peer-to-peer overlay networks, and other similar applications require individual nodes to store data with protocolrelated information. As long as all nodes follow the protocol specification, the distributed data is consistent or may contain a tolerable amount of inconsistencies due to malfunctioning nodes. However, a problem arises as soon as a malicious node enters the network and changes the distributed protocol information at will. Depending on the intentions of the attacker, the working of the protocol can be seriously constrained, for example by a denial of service of parts of the network. As an example, we will present a resource consumption attack on ad-hoc networks in Section 4.2 and show how the list L of authorised nodes can be specified in a straightforward way to express the requirements in this situation.
Control Flow Analysis
Our analysis is specified by a judgement ρ,κ,σ, ε P: σ , making use of certain types of analysis components defined below. Here, ρ is the collection of all local variable environments,σ the collection of all local store environments, V denotes the set of variable-free terms, and the star * represents the type of finite lists. In order to focus on the origin annotations, we do not describe the analysis of the allocation environments here and refer to [6] for this point.
The types of the components reveal the key idea of the origin analysis: values V ∈ V are paired with locations ∈ L in order to express that originated V . For example, if a node (E;x)[x] ? P :
,α σ receives a message Ẽ 1 ,Ẽ 2 [ ] , i.e. originated from , the analysis will compute for the variable environment ρ of that (V i , ) ∈ ρ (x i ) for all estimates V i of components E i ∈Ẽ 2 and respective x i ∈x. Furthermore, as the message is transmitted on the network, it will also compute Ṽ 1 ,Ṽ 2 [ ] ∈κ, i.e. the estimated message contents, originator , and immediate sender will be recorded in the network environment κ. Likewise, the store environmentσ for contains storage tuples and their originators. The annotation variable environmentρ records assignments to annotation variables, i.e. originator locations.
The error component records violations of the store authorisation property. If a node attempts a store Ẽ [ ] Ẽ ↓ P:
,α σ and / ∈L for estimatesL ofẼ , the analysis will make sure that ( , ,L ,Ṽ ) ∈ ε, i.e. , maybe masquerading as one of the authorised nodes with locationsL , tried to insert the tuple Ṽ in the local store of . 
Definition
The actual analysis is defined in Tables 4-6. Table 4 contains the definition of two auxiliary judgements for terms. ρ E : ϑ computes a safe estimation ϑ ⊆ V × L which contains pairs (V, ), where V is a value E can evaluate to and is the originator of this value. In the case for constants terms, i.e. names and locations, every location is assumed to be originator. For a variable x, the estimate ϑ includes variable bindings and originators recorded in ρ (x).
For the estimation of the annotations a second judgementρ E :θ is needed which gives an estimationθ ⊆ L of originator locations.
Note for Table 5 and 6 that (Ẽ, ) ∈θ and similar mean (
. . , E k for some k. Rules flnil and flparr are straightforward. Rule flsend says that the network environment κ is updated with all possible messages and their respective originator and immediate sender, Ṽ [ ] ∈κ. The condition (Ṽ , ) ∈θ makes sure that -originated termsṼ are drawn from the sets of current estimatesθ forẼ. itself is an element of the estimateθ for the annotation term E. Rule flrec on the other hand looks at all messages Ṽ 1 ,Ṽ 2 [ ] recorded in κ. It is checked that (Ṽ 1 , ) ∈θ, i.e. the first components of a sent message match with the expectationẼ, which is estimated inθ. Furthermore, = means that the sending node does not receive messages sent by itself. If these conditions are fulfilled, the variable environments forx and x are updated.
In Table 6 , rule flpar is straightforward. Rule flstore is similar to flsend: instead of inserting a message into the network environment, now a storage tuple is inserted into the local storeσ of the node, Ṽ [ ] ∈σ . Furthermore, if the originator is not element of the estimatesθ for the annotation list, the error component ε is updated.
On the other hand, rule flret resembles rule flrec. Clearly, tuples are now taken from the local store instead of the network environment. For the sake of precision, continuation branch P 1 is only analysed in those cases where storage retrieval could indeed succeed while P 2 is always analysed. This applies analogously to the equality test in rule flif, which is otherwise straightforward. 
Correctness
The subject reduction result in Theorem 3.2 states the semantic correctness of the flow logic with respect to the operational semantics in Section 2.2. We need a substitution lemma first. (1) ρ E : ϑ and (E , ) ∈ ρ(x) imply ρ E[E /x] : ϑ.
(2)ρ E :θ and E ∈ρ(x) implyρ E[E /x] :θ.
(3) ρ,κ,σ, ε P: σ and (E , ) ∈ ρ(x) imply ρ,κ,σ, ε P [E /x]: σ .
(4) ρ,κ,σ, ε P: σ and E ∈ρ(x) imply ρ,κ,σ, ε P [E /x]: σ .
Proof By straightforward structural induction. 
and furthermore from rule flrec
Using κ ⊆κ, we know Ẽ 1 ,Ẽ 2 [ ] ∈κ with (i). From (ii), (iii), and rules flname and flloc, we have ∀ ∈ L. (Ẽ 1 , ) ∈θ sinceẼ 1 is part of a sent message and therefore variable-free. It is clear from the calculus that = , as a node cannot receive its own message. Therefore, we have (Ẽ 2 , ) ∈ ρ (x) ∧ ∈ρ (x) with rule (iv). By applying substitution lemma 3.1 (4) once and 3.1 (3) |Ẽ 2 | times to (v) gives the desired result ρ,κ,σ, ε P [Ẽ 2 /x, /x]: σ .
Rules ret 1 and if 1 can be proved similarly, whilst the remaining rules are directly proved by assumption or application of the corresponding flow logic rule and induction hypothesis.
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The following theorem shows that the derivation in the calculus cannot be stuck because of violations of the store authorisation property if our analysis does not report an error in ε. To establish this, let N 1 unsafe − −− → N 2 be a derivation with the condition E ∈Ẽ of rule store eliminated. Proof We only have to regard rule store as the two inference systems are otherwise the same. From rule store in the unsafe semantics, we have σ = σ ∪ Ẽ [E]. AsẼ and E are thus components of a storage tuple, we have F V (Ẽ) = ∅ and F V (E) = ∅. Therefore, it follows withρ E :θ and ρ Ẽ :θ from rule flstore that (Ẽ, E) ∈θ. Thus, the statement E / ∈θ ⇒ ∀L ∈θ . (E, ,L ,Ẽ) ∈ ε holds. Because ε = ∅ butθ = ∅ it follows E ∈θ . Thus E ∈Ẽ and the conditions for rule store in the standard semantics are fulfilled. 2
Attacker Model
The attacker A is simply specified as the following term of our process calculus, where A ∈ ℘ (N) is the set of arities occurring for a certain network to be analysed andx k denotes a k-element list of variables:
This means that A may receive any message with any number of components and acquire some knowledge in this way. This is then expressed in the analysis by the variable environment ρ A increasing with variable bindings for all messages recorded inκ. On the other hand, A may also forge messages of arities which have already been used in the network. For these messages, the analysis keeps track of A as originator as the sending is annotated with A .
This follows the idea of a classical Dolev-Yao attacker, but with the difference that no cryptography is involved. This is appropriate as the AODV protocol we are modelling in Section 4 does not use cryptographic primitives. We plan to look at secure versions of protocols in future work, where then cryptographic primitives could be added to the calculus like in [1] .
Analysis of the AODV Protocol
In an ad-hoc network, a group of wireless nodes cooperates with each other in order to forward messages to destinations beyond the direct transmission Table 7 The AODV Protocol range of a sender. The Ad-hoc On-demand Distance Vector (AODV) routing protocol [8] is a protocol for this setting in which a node tries to find a route to a destination only if needed (on-demand). It furthermore requires that each node stores a "vector" of direction (the next hop) and distance (number of hops) for a particular destination. In the following we describe the operation of AODV and show how to model it in our calculus. We then perform the analysis of Section 3 in order to detect violations of the store authorisation property in presence of an attacker.
Operation and Modelling of the AODV Protocol
If a node S (source) needs to communicate with another node D (destination) for which it has no routing information, S initiates a route discovery process. Because of the complexity of the protocol, we will describe and model this process in a simplified version by leaving out expiration time and freshness information for routes (sequence numbers) as well as distance information. Furthermore, we define α i ( ) := 1 for all ∈ L and allocation environments α i , i.e. every node can see every other node and the connection graph is the complete graph on L. In Section 4.2 we will discuss the implications of these assumptions on our security analysis in detail.
A route discovery comprises the following steps:
(1) S initiates the route discovery by broadcasting a route request rreq which contains the source, the destination, and the name of the forwarding node of the request. This is a 4-tuple rreq, S, D, N , with N as the immediate sender, thus N = S in the case for S.
(2) Every node N receiving a rreq checks whether it is the destination itself, i.e. N = D.
If not, N will store a vector for the reverse route in order to be able to propagate a reply from D back to S. In case N received the rreq from an immediate sender N , it will thus store the tuple rev, S, N . Then it rebroadcasts the request as rreq, S, D, N , replacing the name of the immediate sender N with its own name.
If N = D, the node will answer with a route reply rrep, which contains its name (the destination), the source, the name of the forwarding node of the reply, and the next hop (the addressee). In case D received the rreq from an immediate sender N , it will thus send the 5-tuple rrep, D, S, D, N . The modelling of the protocol, shown in Table 7 , follows exactly this description. It represents a network of n nodes in which nodes are distinguished by locations 1 , . . . , n to replace the names S, D, N, . . . of the informal description. Every node i tries to initiate a route request to all other nodes j with i = j. As a surplus we have of course the annotations for the origin of messages. For example, in P i , the originator is bound to x orig . When only forwarding messages, as for example with the statement rreq, x src , x dst , i [x orig ] ! N i , the originator remains.
Analysis Results
For some n ∈ N, we analyse the network N n of Table 7 . In a scenario without attacker, all nodes behave according to the specification. For i, j, k, m ∈ {1, . . . , n}, our analysis puts exactly the following messages in the network environment:
This confirms that the analysis is very precise and in particular suitable for the origin analysis: rreqs with i as source do only have i as originator, and analogously for rreps with j . The immediate sender k is in both cases always different from the final receiving node and -in the case of a rrepalso different from the addressee m , which shows the precision of the analysis in this example.
We have a similar precision for the computation of the storesσ i .
For the reverse path rev, which is set up to propagate a possible route reply back to the source i , we have that all storesσ j with i = j contain tuples which have been originated by i and have a next hop k different from j . Analogously, this holds for the forward path forw with the roles of i and j switched.
From this, it is clear that our analysis correctly computes the error component ε as the empty set. This changes as soon as the attacker A, specified in Section 3.3, is added to the analysis. For a concrete example of the attacker's impact, consider the network N 4 with four nodes. In ε, the analysis will insert tuples of the form ( A , , ,Ẽ) where A (fixed) is the location of the attacker who masquerades as and thus would succeed in inserting the tupleẼ intoσ . We consider the case where the attacker is masquerading as 4 , i.e. = 4 , and look at the forw-cases with = 1 , 2 , 3 . For the sake of clarity, we will show in Table 8 the tuple (Ẽ) instead of the full tuple ( A , , 4 ,Ẽ), and indicate in the top row, at which location this tuple is inserted. Table 8 shows the following: As the attacker A may forge any message using names and locations occurring in communications he was able to eavesdrop on, A can succeed in inserting arbitrary tuples at all locations. Thus every possible next hop 1 , . . . , 4 shows as the third component of each storage tuple. It is important to note that none of these values is actually a false positive: Tuples in the error component exactly represent violations of the property, and any of these tuples might affect the proper working of the protocol.
However, not any inserted tuple will have the same effect and usually a 1, 2, 3) , the "next hop" for destination 4 would be specified as i itself: It is likely that this inconsistency will be detected by the respective node by consistency checks not included in our modelling. A similar argument applies if A chooses to insert the tuples of line 4: Nodes would just try to forward messages to node 4 which they expect to be in their neighbourhood. If 4 is indeed in the neighbourhood, the functioning of the protocol is not restrained. Otherwise, the nodes would just assume that 4 moved out of their transmission range and start a route repair process.
On the other hand, choosing line 2 or 3 will prove to be a powerful attack on the network: In both cases, the forwarding links form a loop, for example in line 2, 1 will forward to 2 , 2 to 3 , and 3 to 1 . Thus, if A drops a message for 4 in the system, it will be forwarded as long as the power resources of the nodes last or a node leaves the network for other reasons. This resource consumption attack is known as a routing loop [5] .
However, definite conclusions about the security of the AODV protocol require a look at our assumptions from Section 4. The omission of the expiration time information seems valid as it concerns only reverse routes. Similarly, the attacker may choose distance information at will and as such always advertise routes requiring less hops which thus are accepted by the honest nodes. In contrast, sequence numbers are a key fact used in the proof of the loop-free property of the AODV protocol in [8] and it seems problematic to omit them in our model. We can however refer to [4] where an attack is described which sets a sequence number of a node to any desired value.
Our last assumption concerned the topology of the network. Our framework can express fine-grained topology information, as shown in [6] , but in our model we chose to consider the fully connected graph only. This decision arises from the following observation: If we specified a particular topology for a scenario of n nodes, results would be restricted to this choice. If we then derive that a certain attack is not possible in the network, the same attack might still be possible for another topology. By taking the complete graph, we perform a safe analysis in the sense that the attacker will monitor the max-imum of possibly sent messages in the network and gain maximal knowledge for an attack.
It is not possible though to draw the conclusion that an attacker A may introduce a routing loop into any network with more than four nodes. Quite the contrary, A will have to use knowledge about the network topology in order to insert different tuples at different locations: it might for example be necessary to move closer to particular nodes and to prevent others from hearing a certain communication. For other topologies, the attack might be simply impossible, e.g. if feasible physical connections never form a loop.
Conclusion
We have presented a broadcast process calculus with local storage operations which proved to be expressive enough to model the core of a distance vector protocol for ad-hoc networks. The calculus is extended with annotations which allow to verify the compliance of participating nodes with the property that only certain authorised nodes may force other nodes to store specific data. We have developed a static analysis which can detect violations of this property. As to our knowledge, this is the first application of formal automated methods for security analysis in the setting of ad-hoc networks.
The application of the analysis to our protocol model showed that a simple attacker who records all network communication and forges arbitrary messages using this knowledge, may introduce a routing loop in some networks. The analysis is safe in the sense that it produces all possible attacks. However, some of these attacks might be not applicable if a certain network topology is given, a fact that is not deduced by the analysis. The interpretation of the analysis results needed thus careful consideration of our assumptions.
By extending routing messages with cryptographic features such as signatures or hash chains, the development of secure versions of routing protocols is under way, e.g. in [5] . It thus suggests itself that future work should include an extension of the calculus to cryptographic primitives in order to put the security of these protocols to the test and maybe reveal unknown flaws.
Furthermore, the discussion of the analysis results has shown that the influence of topology considerations on security questions needs more investigation. Our calculus provides a basis for this, as it allows the consideration of arbitrary topologies. In most applications, the choice of a specific topology will be too simple. But it might be advantageous to consider certain classes of topologies by just assuming allocation environments to be defined according to appropriate constraints. When allowing for changes of the allocation environments over time, even node mobility could be expressed.
